China threw Myanmar’s regime a diplomatic lifeline by welcoming junta boss Min Aung Hlaing to a regional summit this month.
Rumors now swirl about potential military and economic assistance from Beijing.
China has been treading lightly, mindful of both international and Myanmar’s domestic hostility to the regime but it appears Min Aung Hlaing returned with some valuable Chinese promises.
China and northern Myanmar
Regime supporters and foreign observers have traditionally viewed the armed organizations along the Chinese border as Beijing’s puppets.
China pressured the groups based in northern Myanmar to sign the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, participate in the Union Peace Conference and work with Myanmar’s military. The armed groups instead formed the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee to respond collectively to China’s pressure.
Operation 1027, launched in October last year, caused a rift between China and northern armed groups. The organizations initially tried to please Beijing by cracking down on online fraud syndicates operating along the border. But Beijing has now chosen to back the regime and it forced the armed groups to sign a truce in January this year to end the regime’s series of humiliating defeats.
The northern armed groups want to win China’s approval but Beijing does not have them on a string. They want to maintain good ties with China but they may not at the cost of sacrificing their ambitions of self-determination.
China told the Kachin Independence Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) to halt their offensives, with threats to cut off supplies of food, electricity and fuel.
As tensions have risen recently, some groups have chosen to send only lower-level representatives instead of senior members when summoned by China for talks in Yunnan.
China told the United Wa State Army (UWSA) not to supply the groups fighting the regime. The Arakan Army – which operates in Rakhine State further from China’s reach – has conducted its offensives against the regime, free from Chinese interference since November last year.
Tensions between China and the MNDAA and TNLA have increased since June when the two groups abandoned China’s peace deal. The MNDAA subsequently seized the Northeastern Command and northern Shan State capital, Lashio. In response, China closed its Shan State border crossings.
Border closures
The regime now only controls Muse after losing all other Shan and Kachin border crossings.
The closed border appears to be China’s attempt to throttle the armed groups and expose them to a regime counteroffensive.
China has reinforced the borders with barbed wire. The crossings to Wa state and Kokang are manned by the Chinese security services to stop goods from reaching the MNDAA and TNLA.
The regime has blockaded roads to northern Shan State, including the Taunggyi-Lawksawk road, but it struggles to impose a total blockade due to junta corruption at its checkpoints, which is one of the reasons drug trafficking is still rampant in Myanmar.
And the Chinese and regime blockades are less effective in Kachin State.
Overall, China’s blockades appear not to have put the expected pressure on the northern armed groups.
Junta counteroffensive
The regime appears to be planning to hit back in northern Shan State after imposing a blockade with China’s help. However, targeting Lashio is not enough.
To control trade routes to China, the regime needs to retake Nawnghkio, Lashio, Hseni, Kunlong, Chin Shwe Haw, Kutkai and Nampaka.
The regime has been collecting troops in Namlan and Mongyai, presumably to attack the MNDAA in Lashio. But to retake the rest of northern Shan State, the regime must advance along the highway from Pyin Oo Lwin in Mandalay Region to Nawnghkio, Hsipaw and Lashio in Shan State. Only control of the highway would allow the regime to use its artillery and armor effectively while ensuring easier supply lines.
The regime will need more troops for offensives in Namhsan and Mantung as it lacks strong bases in the area to support frontline troops.
The People’s Defence Forces have left northern Shan but the MNDAA has expanded to six brigades and the TNLA to nine. Any junta offensive would likely require tens of thousands of troops while the ranks are already stretched thin and recruitment is a pressing issue.
Recruitment crisis
Chinese military technology cannot mask the regime’s depleted ranks. Analysts estimate that around 150 battalion headquarters only exist on paper, while the remaining units are increasingly threadbare.
The implementation of February’s Conscription Law has been hampered by corruption and extortion. Recruiting officers are more focused on lining their pockets and the regime’s targets are not being met.
Forcibly conscripted recruits are sent straight to the frontline after a few weeks of training where they are rapidly killed or captured.
No conscripts are willingly signing up and there are few experienced troops to hold units together. Conscrips are left to fend for themselves in the chaos of battle. The imbalance between raw recruits and a few experienced soldiers means there is no hope of combat effectiveness.
Resistance volunteers often take around two years to learn combat skills while junta conscripts lack motivation and training. Few will develop into competent fighters.
With fighting in Rakhine, Chin, Kachin and Karen states and Sagaing Region, the junta urgently needs to bolster its forces on numerous fronts and will not be able to gather a force strong enough to seize back northern Shan State in the near future.
Even if a new force can be found, success is not guaranteed: a poorly prepared operation is likely to suffer heavy losses.
Conclusion
China wants to support a regime that the northern armed groups are committed to fighting.
It is unlikely that the regime will be able to launch an offensive to retake the lost border territories in the next six months. In the meantime, it might instead focus on airstrikes and the use of advanced drones, psychological warfare and propaganda.
In MNDAA territory, battles could erupt if the military strikes towns surrounding Lashio ahead of a larger offensive. The MNDAA is unlikely to attack Tangyan and Mongyai where its allies, the UWSA and Shan State Progress Party, are deployed. But it may advance near those towns, which could increase tensions.
Fighting will continue in Nawnghkio in northern Shan State and Banhbwe towards Pyin Oo Lwin.
Armed groups are expected to undertake new operations in response to junta airstrikes.
The groups appear confident in their ability to survive Chinese and junta blockades and any regime counteroffensives. They will await Beijing’s next steps if its blockades fail.
The impacts of the proposed joint security “company” between the regime and China and the possibility of China’s detention of the leaders of armed groups will also need to be monitored. With its in-depth knowledge of Myanmar, China’s next steps will not be simple.
Ko Oo is an ethnic minority affairs analyst.
