The 2021 coup has seen an increase in the number of ethnic armed organizations fighting the Myanmar military, but some are cooperating with the regime. A number of these junta-friendly ethnic armies have considerable strength, and should not be underestimated. Two such groups are the southern Shan State-based Pa-O National Organization/Pa-O National Army (PNO/PNA) and the Shanni Nationalities Army (SNA), mainly active in Sagaing Region. This piece examines their histories as well as their motivations for aligning with the junta and going to war against members of their own ethnic groups.
Pa-O National Organization/Pa-O National Army
The PNO/PNA is a seasoned ethnic armed group primarily based in the Pa-O region around Taunggyi in southern Shan State.
After many decades of armed rebellion, the group entered a ceasefire with the previous regime, known at that time as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), on April 18, 1991. Subsequently, the SLORC designated its territory as Shan State Special Region 6. With its headquarters in Kyauk Talone Gyi near Taunggyi, the PNO had 1,400 troops at the time of the ceasefire.
One of two ethnic Pa-O armed groups active in that era, the PNO/PNA, led by Aung Kham Hti, was known as the “White Pa-O”.
The other group, the Shan State Nationalities People’s Organization (SSNPLO), also known as the “Red Pa-O” and led by Saw Tar Klel, was stronger than the PNO. It had 3,148 troops at the time of its ceasefire with the SLORC on Oct. 9, 1994. It was based in Naw Htaung near Hsihseng, but the regime did not grant its territory “special region” status.
After the ceasefire, the PNO grew closer to the Myanmar military, which trusted the armed group as it flew the banners of nationalism and Buddhism. On the other hand, the military did not favor the SSNPLO, perceiving them to be left-leaning insurgents cooperating with the Communist Party of Burma.
In the 2000s, the SSNPLO gradually fragmented, with some members surrendering their arms, while others were disarmed, leading to the group’s dissolution. Meanwhile, the PNO went from strength to strength thanks to lucrative business deals awarded by the Myanmar military.
In 2009, the PNO transformed into a political party in line with the military-drafted constitution adopted by the regime one year earlier. The PNA was reorganized as a militia group under the guidance of the regime, which by this time had changed its name to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).
In the 2010, 2015 and 2020 general elections, the PNO won all seats in Hsihseng, Pinlaung and Hopong townships, which constitute the Pa-O Self-Administered Zone under the 2008 Constitution. It is the closest ally of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). The PNA is headquartered in Taunggyi, operating under the command of the Myanmar military.
PNO leaders Aung Kham Hti, Khun San Lwin (the son of Hla Pe, who led the Pa-O rebellion), and Ne Win Tun are prominent Pa-O leaders with ties to Myanmar military generals.
While the SSNPLO essentially collapsed, another Pa-O group, the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO), emerged but never gained a similar strength, its operations confined to Mawkmai. As a result, the PNO’s influence has grown, its administrative power now extending over the three Pa-O townships. Additionally, the PNO has played the religion and nationalism cards to mobilize pious Pa-O people.
After the military coup in 2021, as the Myanmar military faced widespread resistance, it mobilized armed groups close to it. The PNO was one of the first groups the regime approached. Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing personally met with Pa-O leader Aung Kham Hti to consolidate their alliance.
As clashes escalated in Karenni State, resistance groups based in southern Shan State started to operate south of Inle. With combined Karenni and PNLO forces posing a threat to Hsihseng, Pinlaung and adjacent Naypyitaw, the regime has expanded the PNO.
Media reports suggest the PNO trained as many as 12,000 recruits last year. There were also reports that it had conscripted one person per household, and that every village had to contribute to its army’s expenditure, while the Eastern Command of the Myanmar military supplies it with arms and ammunition.
Even if not all of the group’s more than 10,000 members are armed, sources on the ground and junta media reports indicate the regime has armed thousands of them.
Today, the PNA is led by Ne Win Tun, who came to prominence only after the ceasefire and has amassed wealth from his cooperation with the Myanmar military.
Another leader, Khun San Lwin, joined the All Burma Students Democratic Front during the pro-democracy uprising in 1988. He is a son of Hla Pe. Khun San Lwin later joined the PNO and served as the chairman of the Pa-O Self-Administered Zone formed under the 2008 Constitution. He now sits on the junta’s State Administration Council.
A few ethnic Pa-O resistance groups including the Pa-O National Federal Council led by Khun Myint Tun and the Pa-O National Liberation Army led by Khun Thurein have been fighting the regime, but the PNO is the strongest of the Pa-O ethnic armed groups and is supplied by the Myanmar military.
Together with the Myanmar military, the PNO provides security in Pinlaung Township, the gateway to Naypyitaw, the nerve center of the regime. It helps the regime ward off offensives by resistance groups advancing on Inle from Moebye and Pekon. It also assists the regime with its attacks on Karenni State’s Loikaw from the Pa-O region. Together with the regime, it has been attacking the PNLO east of Hsihseng, and chasing the retreating PNLO troops to Mawkmai.
The PNA provides the regime with a buffer against resistance groups in northern Shan State and Karenni resistance groups. Currently, it is a vital pillar of support for the regime in southern Shan State.
Shanni Nationalities Army
Founded on July 5, 1989, the SNA is the last of the Shanni armed groups that emerged from the Shanni political movement in the 1970s.
Myanmar people have witnessed the military’s divide-and-rule strategy in action in Rakhine State, where it is attempting to hold on to power by stoking conflict between the Rakhine and Muslim communities. The regime has long exercised the same approach in Kachin, driving a wedge between the Shanni and Kachin communities.
The Myanmar military fanned racial conflict between the Kachin and Shanni in the mid-1970s, leading to mass killings in parts of Kachin.
As a result, Shanni people sought to take up arms, and with the support of the Myanmar military, they formed militia groups in Kachin. The Myanmar military also patronizes the Shanni Literature and Culture Association in Kachin. While Shanni militias are still present in certain parts of Kachin State, they are not strong or unified.
In Sagaing, however, the SNA, like other Shanni groups based there, sought a Shanni State comprising parts of Kachin and Sagaing. To this end, they collected taxes to raise an army and started military activities, which resulted in confrontations with the Myanmar military starting in 2015. The SNA was active along the Chindwin River, especially in the Hkamti and Homalin areas. In 2020, there were reports that the SNA was collecting taxes and tolls from vessels along the Chindwin River.
Though there were reports of resultant military operations by the Myanmar military in the region, no clashes were reported. The military reportedly persuaded the SNA to disarm and transform itself into a militia group under its control.
As of 2021, the leadership of the SNA comprised Chairman Sao Than Myint, Vice Chairman Khun Aung and Secretary Sao Tan Pha, with three brigades operating in Sagaing Region, specifically in Hkamti, along Uru Creek in Homalin Township, in Paungbyin town and in Banmauk. The SNA leaders are rarely seen in public, however.
In 2021, the SNA’s total strength was estimated at between 500 and 1,000 members. Its headquarters is reportedly located in the mountains north of Banmauk on the border of Kachin and Sagaing.
As of 2021, the SNA mainly engaged in guerilla warfare along the Chindwin River in Paungbyin, Homalin and Hkamti in Sagaing. Some troops were also active between the Chindwin River and the Indian border.
The SNA apparently aimed to penetrate Mohnyin, Mogaung and Indawgyi in Kachin State, but was not sufficiently equipped to fight the Kachin Independence Army, which dominates the area.
In April 2021, two months after the Myanmar military seized power in a coup, SNA representatives reportedly traveled to Naypyitaw and held discussions with the generals. The SNA reportedly requested that it be recognized as an ethnic armed organization and allowed to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, but the regime refused. Prior to this, there had been reports of the SNA training anti-regime People’s Defense Force groups (PDFs) in Banmauk and Homalin.
Later on, especially in 2022, the SNA’s stance changed. While the exact reasons are unknown, it is reasonable to assume the regime exploited the conflict between the Shanni and Kachin, as the PDF was aligned with the KIA. The regime might have offered to supply the SNA with arms and ammunition.
It is also possible that the regime has granted the SNA autonomy over areas where it has been active, in exchange for its support. There are gold mines in Banmauk, Homalin and Uru Creek, and jade mines in Hkamti, providing the SNA with opportunities to fill its coffers.
Since late 2022, the SNA has been seen collaborating with the military, establishing bases and engaging in battles against the KIA and Kachin State People’s Defense Force (KPDF) in Uru Creek, and fighting PDFs in areas such as Homalin, Banmauk, Pinlebu and Tamu.
Thanks to its cooperation with the regime, the SNA has acquired weapons and ammunition. The gold mines in SNA-controlled areas west of Banmauk are the most productive in Sagaing Region, strengthening the SNA financially. The SNA has grown rapidly by collecting taxes from jade mines in Hkamti without interference by the Myanmar military.
Adding to its Special Brigade 614 based in Sagaing Region, the SNA last year formed a new brigade—Brigade 565—in Kachin State’s Mohnyin Township with the approval of the Myanmar military.
Unlikely to switch sides soon
Both the SNA and PNO are ethnic armed groups driven by nationalism, but their cooperation with the Myanmar military makes them an enemy of the Spring Revolution. The SNA is weaker than the PNO, however, and does not control strategically significant areas. There are other differences, as well.
The KPDF based in Mohnyin and Uru Creek, as well as PDFs based in Homalin, Banmauk and Hkamti, are made up of Shanni people. They are of the same ethnicity as the SNA, and the two groups compete for public support. While the PNO is strong in all three Pa-O townships, the SNA is spread out across Tamu, Banmauk, Homalin and Hkamti in Sagaing and Mohnyin in Kachin State.
Recently, the SNA was forced to retreat from some areas in Pinlebu, Banmauk and Paungbyin due to attacks by PDFs. Its forces are strongest in Homalin.
It is evident that the military treats the SNA as a militia group similar to the PNO. Both groups will continue to cooperate with the Myanmar military regime in the near future, and revolutionary forces need to take them into account. While efforts should be made to persuade these two groups to fight the regime, the PNO and SNA currently show no signs of switching sides, because the current situation serves their interests.
Only when they see signs of a possible junta collapse are these groups likely to reconsider their allegiances.
