In this interview with The Irrawaddy, National Unity Government (NUG) Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung shares the civilian government’s milestones and challenges as resistance against the military junta enters its fifth year. She highlights key achievements in 2024, including territorial gains, international accountability efforts, and governance in liberated areas, while addressing criticisms of the NUG’s leadership and ability to collaborate with ethnic groups.
She also examines the complex regional dynamics shaping Myanmar’s crisis, including neighboring countries’ controversial support for the junta’s planned 2025 elections and China’s role in the conflict. Amid these challenges, she delivers a message of unity and determination, reaffirming the NUG’s commitment to a democratic, inclusive Myanmar.
What were the NUG’s three biggest achievements locally and internationally in 2024?
The first achievements in 2024 were military. The expansion of territories controlled by the NUG’s People’s Defense Force groups (PDFs) along with local PDFs in Sagaing and Magwe regions gained them significant battlefield experience, and they are now capable of sustaining multi-day operations, as demonstrated by the Pinlebu battle in Sagaing.
Another important achievement was the successful visits of NUG ministers, including the minister of defense, to controlled areas. Despite ongoing airstrikes, they met with local communities on the ground, which marked a significant achievement in terms of public engagement and governance.
Additionally, the NUG has made strides in organizing taxation, particularly by increasing revenue collection from natural resources in controlled territories.
Internationally, we have collaborated with global actors to hold the military junta accountable for crimes against humanity. It is most important to recall that the ICC [International Criminal Court] prosecutor has now applied for an arrest warrant against [junta leader] Min Aung Hlaing for the crimes he committed against the Rohingya. The NUG has also established a new liaison office in Timor-Leste, and we have engaged with key governments during visits to Japan, Korea and Australia to advocate for Myanmar’s cause and to assist Myanmar citizens abroad.
Furthermore, our efforts to deliver unified political messages from the NUG and allied groups to ASEAN [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations] and envoys were reflected in the ASEAN Summit’s agreements. The extension of Ambassador U Kyaw Moe Htun’s representation at the UN for another year is also a significant achievement for all of Myanmar. He speaks before the world for the whole of our country.
As Myanmar’s revolution against the military junta turns four, there has been growing criticism of the NUG and its organizations’ actions. For the NUG, are there any reforms in the pipeline for 2025 and are there things you are planning to fix?
The NUG continuously listens to the people and adjusts its actions based on the ground realities. However, given the sheer number of issues we face, it’s true that some actions may not yet have yielded significant impact.
As the revolution progresses, new challenges are emerging due to changes in both the domestic and international political landscapes. To address these challenges and improve efficiency, the cabinet is currently discussing reforms as a process designed to make us fit for purpose at this stage of the people’s revolution.
Our focus is to prioritize practical reforms that align with our strategic goals. While there are numerous areas to address, we must carefully weigh the pros and cons and implement reforms that bring the most immediate impact to the revolution.
Nearly four years after the coup, we’ve seen the regime gain support, including for its upcoming elections, from neighboring countries including China, India and Thailand. Is this an indication that the NUG and its resistance allies are losing political momentum in international relations?
Actually, the SAC [the State Administration Council, as the regime is officially known] has been claiming it would hold elections since the coup, yet it hasn’t succeeded. It faces mounting military, political, and public resistance. The junta is now attempting to push for elections in 2025 as a desperate way to regain some scrap of legitimacy after suffering extensive losses.
Some neighboring countries still fail to grasp the deep determination of the Myanmar people. Myanmar’s problems cannot be solved through a sham election based upon a failed census. We must address deep-rooted issues that require a political agreement guaranteeing genuine system change.
We know that the NUG and revolutionary groups need to present a clear, inclusive political plan to the international community. This will make evident that the junta’s proposed elections are neither a long-term solution nor an acceptable path for Myanmar’s future. That is why we are actively working on this. It is necessary to unite and accelerate the discussions and negotiations among the revolutionary forces.
Briefly, how do you assess the approaches of ASEAN, the US, China, Thailand and India towards Myanmar in 2024?
Most international actors continue to adopt an ASEAN-centric approach. However, there are differences in how individual countries engage. Some, particularly neighboring ASEAN countries, still prioritize relations with the SAC.
The United States has imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions based on democratic principles but remains cautious about escalating tensions with China due to regional strategic interests.
In the end, Myanmar’s revolution is about self-reliance. Only the people of Myanmar can change the country’s destiny, and our reliance on ourselves has proven to be the right path.
Thailand organized an informal consultation and ASEAN held informal talks on Myanmar in December. What do you think of these approaches? Will they benefit the Myanmar people, and help achieve their wish to restore democracy and the basic rights stolen from them by the junta?
It’s understandable that Thailand, as our neighbor, would take steps to engage on Myanmar’s issues. However, how these efforts are conducted matters significantly. The focus should be on listening to the voices of the Myanmar people, not just engaging with the junta.
The December meeting was a unilateral effort that did not represent the will of the Myanmar people. For a lasting solution, it’s crucial to build people-to-people relations that prioritize long-term mutual interests. Unfortunately, by continuing to engage only with the oppressors, our neighbors have ignored the voices and suffering of the people, which is why the slogan “We only have us” has become so prominent.
Neighboring countries, including China, and others have shown support for the junta’s 2025 election plan. What do you say to that?
First and foremost, the SAC’s upcoming election is not a solution for Myanmar. It lacks moral and political legitimacy. Conducting an election while the junta is actively committing war crimes against the very people who would be voting makes it unacceptable. It will never be legitimate.
Even if the SAC proceeds with its plans, it won’t be able to regain control of its lost territories. Meanwhile, the NUG and ethnic revolutionary organizations are already building governance structures rooted in public support. The ultimate objective of the Spring Revolution is to achieve systematic change rather than merely regime change. This fundamental shift towards a more equitable and democratic society has begun in areas controlled by revolutionary forces, reflecting a bottom-up approach to change.
Neighboring countries must understand that supporting a sham election won’t lead to stability in Myanmar. Instead, it will likely result in further violence, in deeper chaos and more unrest.
In 2024, China made a series of interventions in ethnic armed organizations’ (EAOs’) military operations in Myanmar. Many critics see this as self-interested interference by China. What’s your comment on this issue?
China has long-standing relationships with ethnic revolutionary organizations along the Myanmar-China border. Given its substantial investments in Myanmar, China is understandably concerned about stability amidst the junta’s impending collapse.
While China’s primary goal is to protect its economic interests, it cannot achieve this by pressuring ethnic groups solely to serve its agenda. If China genuinely wants to protect its interests, it must recognize that the junta has lost significant control. We welcome China’s engagement with the people’s legitimate representatives.
The SAC is a failing regime. Any attempt to prop it up will prove ineffective and too little, too late.
Leaked minutes of a meeting between Wa and Chinese officials last year show Beijing still doesn’t trust the NUG. You have made positive overtures toward China, and have already stated the NUG’s stand on China, but still fail to gain its trust. Why?
Historically, China has never supported pro-democracy movements in Myanmar and has viewed them with suspicion. This stems from both geopolitical and ideological concerns.
Chinese officials and policymakers need to understand that only by working with the government and political forces backed by the majority of Myanmar’s people can their strategic interests be safeguarded. We welcome a constructive engagement with China at any time.
The international community, including the US and other democracies, haven’t supported Myanmar’s resistance movement against the regime. One of the main reasons they give is that the NUG’s leadership lacks credibility and has failed to engage with ethnic groups, including EAOs. What are the main issues that have prevented the NUG from establishing this central role for itself since its formation in 2021?
Since its formation, the NUG has invited ethnic revolutionary forces to join its ranks. However, ethnic leadership participation remains limited.
One of the key challenges for the NUG is building trust and fostering collaboration with ethnic groups. Historical grievances, unresolved issues of self-determination, and long-standing mistrust must be addressed to strengthen these relationships.
Moreover, the NUG’s approach to leadership — emphasizing collective leadership rather than a single entity — has raised questions internationally. This revolutionary political culture requires more time to prove its effectiveness.
But we know our challenges and opportunities in the current situation and we believe this is the best time to support us.
What do you think the new Trump administration will bring for Myanmar and its pro-democracy movement? When it comes to Myanmar issues, does Trump give you more hope than the Biden administration, or less?
The US government’s policies concerning Burma reflect a consistent approach shared by both the Democratic and Republican parties, making it unlikely that significant changes will occur under President Trump.
February 2025 will mark four years that the people of Myanmar have suffered under military rule. Does the NUG have any specific and realistic political message for them?
For 2025, our message is clear: This year will bring both military challenges and also political challenges. We need to transform these challenges into opportunities and into victory. So, we will face these together with unity and solidarity, working towards our goal of a federal and inclusive Myanmar that is free of the scourge of military misrule.
We remain committed to ensuring that all the sacrifices made by the people of Myanmar will not be in vain. Every step we take brings us closer to the goal of a free and democratic Myanmar.
